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PUBLIC FINANCE IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM:
BASIC PATTERNS AND CURRENT ISSUES
Richard Briffault*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Public finance issues with significant consequences for American federalism
have been at the top of the political agenda for the last several years. Indeed,
much of the current debate about American federalism has been explicitly about
questions of public finance: Which level of government should pay for which
programs? What is to be the relationship between financial responsibility and
policy-making authority? Should there be some overall limitation on government
outlays and receipts?
Thus, one of the first actions of the 104th Congress was passage of a
measure, swiftly signed into law by the President, to curb the ability of the
federal government to force states and localities to undertake costly programs
without providing federal funds that would cover those programs' costs.,
Congress also quickly took up a central element of the Republican Contract
With America - the balanced budget amendment, which passed the House of
Representatives but fell just short of the constitutionally required two-thirds
majority in the Senate. In addition, Congress and the President spent months
struggling over proposals to change basic components of the social safety net,
such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid, in
order to reduce the federal government's role and devolve greater responsibility
to the states. Each of these initiatives - as well as other measures such as the
line-item veto, recently enacted into law, 2 and the flat tax proposals that
dominated the early phases of the 1996 Presidential campaign - has important
implications for the size and composition of the national budget, nation-state
relations, and the ongoing development of American fiscal federalism.
In this paper, I will consider the basic elements of American fiscal federalism
and these current issues. The federal constitution gives relatively little direct
attention to the structure of public finance. The Constitution gives the federal
government broad authority to raise and spend money, and imposes some
constraints on the states, but most of the critical questions concerning the scope
and content of federal and state budgets and the relationship between the two
levels of government are left to political, not constitutional, determination.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
2

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, P.L. 104-4.
Line-Item Veto Act of 1996, P.L. 104-330.
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In the absence of formal constitutional resolution of these questions, we have
developed an informal fiscal constitution. To a considerable extent, the federal
government, the states, and local governments rely on different sources of
revenue and undertake different spending responsibilities. The widespread use of
intergovernmental grants sometimes blurs the distinctions among the levels of
government, but the differences do exist and they are relatively persistent. This
informal constitution also involves a considerable amount of federal-state
interaction. Federal regulatory, taxing and spending decisions have direct
implications for state and local finances. Conversely, state fiscal practices have
begun to shape federal fiscal decisions and, indeed, have emerged as a model for
a federal fiscal reform agenda.
After examining the basic components of the informal fiscal constitution, I
will turn to three current issues: mandates relief, block grants, and the balanced
budget amendment. Unfunded mandates and block grants deal with federal-state
interactions. The balanced budget amendment addresses only the federal
government - although a long-term consequence may be a reduction in federal
assistance to states and localities. Moreover, as with any measure that affects
federal-state relations, each of these issues has significant implications for
interstate relations and for the substance of public policy.
11.

BASIC PAITERNS OF FISCAL FEDERALISM

A. The Constitution and Public Finance
1. The Federal Government
The Constitution gives the federal government very broad authority to raise
and spend money.' The federal government may, without limitation, raise money
by borrowing or by manipulating the currency. The federal government may also
raise money by taxation, subject only to the minimal requirements that direct
taxes and capitation taxes be allocated among the states in proportion to
population; 4 that customs duties and excise taxes be uniform throughout the
6
United States; 5 and that no duties be levied upon exports from any state.
With the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, which permits imposition
of a federal income tax without apportionment among the states, the only real
constitutional limitations on the federal taxing power are the rule of
nondiscrimination against particular states and the ban on export taxes. In
practice, the Uniformity Clause places few restrictions on Congress' power to
7
create classifications for tax purposes, or to levy a progressive income tax.
Although the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment operates as a general
limitation on the power to tax, the Clause has little or no effect in constraining
3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8,

cl. 1, cl. 2, cl. 5.
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3; art. I, sec. 9, cl. 4, 5.
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 5.
7 ROTUNDA & NOwAK, TREATSE ON CONSTIrmtrONAL LAW:
1995).

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

§5.4 (2d.
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federal taxation.'
Turning to spending, the Constitution broadly empowers Congress to "provide
for the common defense and general welfare." With the general expansion of
federal pavers over the last two centuries, the Spending Power has grown as
well. Moreover, as the Supreme Court confirmed in South Dakota v Dole in
1987, "the constitutional limitations on Congress when exercising its spending
authority are less exacting than those on its power to regulate directly." 9
Congress may spend money, and it can attach conditions to federal funds that
enable it to affect policy, even in areas that Congress may not regulate directly.
"Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative
fields' . . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power
and the conditional grant of federal funds."10
Dole, which involved a federal statute withholding federal highway funds
from any state that failed to adopt Congress' choice of a minimum drinking age,
is a particularly powerful example of Congress' authority to use federal spending
power to influence state decision-making. Due to the Twenty-first Amendment,
which gives states specific powers concerning the regulation of liquor, the
drinking age is arguably the rare subject reserved to the states and beyond the
scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority. Without resolving whether the
Twenty-first Amendment actually prevents Congress from enacting a nationwide
drinking age, the Court determined that Congress' use of federal funds "to
encourage uniformity in the States' drinking ages" was "within constitutional
bounds even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages directly."" Similarly,
the Court indicated that "a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on
congressional regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of
12
conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.'
2.

State and Local Governments

The federal constitution does not constitute state or local governments. States
and localities do not derive their powers to borrow, tax, or spend from the
federal constitution or the federal government. Rather, the states have legislative
and fiscal autonomy, with inherent powers to borrow, tax, and spend, and, to
delegate those fiscal powers to their localities.
The Constitution does impose some specific limitations on the states. States
may not print or coin money or emit bills of credit, and they may not levy
imposts or duties on imports or exports.' 3 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause to prohibit state fiscal practices - like other forms of state
regulation - that discriminate against non-residents or burden interstate
Ild. at §5.5.
9 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987).
0 Id. at 207 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
I ld. at 206.
2

Id. at 210, citing Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).

13 U.S. CoNsT. art. I., sec. 10.
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commerce or fundamental rights. The Due Process Clause limits the ability of
states to tax out-of-state entities or activities that lack some minimal nexus to
the taxing state. And, since McCulloch v Maryland,14 the Supremacy Clause
protects federal property and instrumentalities from state and local ta~tion.
However, apart from state fiscal practices that affect fundamental rights,
federal supremacy, matters of special federal interest such as American Indians,
or interstate commerce, there are few federal constitutional restrictions on state
borrowing, taxation, or spending. The Equal Protection Clause imposes little
constraint on the ability of states to classify for purposes of taxation, and the
Due Process Clause imposes no restriction on the level of state taxation.
As a result of the expanded role of the federal government, and the paucity of
constitutional detail concerning fiscal practices, federal, state, and local
governments are largely free to raise and spend as much money as they want, to
call on the same revenue sources, and to spend on the same programs. The
Constitution does little to allocate or organize fiscal responsibilities among the
different levels of government. In practice, however, the different levels of
government do, to some extent, rely on different revenue sources and spend on
different programs, coordinate their activities, and take on different fiscal
functions.
B.

The Informal Constitution of Fiscal Federalism

1. The Federal Government
The central features of federal fiscal practices are (a) the size of the federal
budget, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and total government
spending; (b) a focus on redistribution and payments to individuals, rather than
the provision of public goods and services or the support of the state or local
governments that supply those goods and services; (c) reliance on the taxation of
incomes as the primary revenue source; and (d) the budget deficit.
a.

Size

In the 1995 fiscal year, the federal government took in $1,351 billion in
receipts and spent $1,514 billion in total outlays. 15 Federal receipts amounted to
19.3% of GDP; the outlays were 21.6% of GDP. These figures have been fairly
consistent for decades, with federal receipts running between 17.4% and 20.2%
of GDP every year since 1960, and federal outlays running between 20.7% and
24.4% of GDP every year since 1978. Federal outlays as a percentage of the
budget have exhibited a modest downward trend since 1983, with 1995's figure
the lowest since 1979.16
Federal outlays in FY 1994 were 63% of all government (that is, federal,
state, and local, combined) outlays, and 58% of all government domestic
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Is The Economic Report of the President 1996, at 367.
16 Id.
14

1996]

U.S. PUBLIC FINANCE

spending. These figures have also been fairly stable over the post-War period.
The federal share of total government spending has ranged between 62% and
70%, and has accounted for between 48% and 58% of domestic spending,
between 1959 and 1994.
b. Redistribution
Five program areas absorb virtually the entire federal budget: Social Security
(22.2% of total spending); defense and international affairs (19.1%); health,
including Medicare, (18.3%); other income security programs (14.5%); and
interest payments on the national debt (15.3%). Leaving aside defense and
interest payments, this means that approximately 55% of the domestic budget is
devoted to transfer payments to individuals or other redistributive programs. 7
Approximately 15% of the federal budget ($196 billion in FY 1994) consists
of grants in aid to states and localities. Most of this money is earmarked for
health or income security programs. These are effectively transfer payments to
individuals rather than intergovernmental assistance to states and localities.
c. Revenues
The federal government relies on three principal revenue sources: the
individual income tax (43.7% of receipts); the corporate income tax (11.6%);
and social insurance taxes and contributions (35.9%). Together, these three
sources - which are all taxes on income and/or wages - accounted for 91.2%
of all federal revenues.18 This does not count borrowing, which finances roughly
one-fifth of federal spending.
The principal trends in federal revenue sources are modest declines in the role
of the individual income tax - down from 49.1% of federal revenues in 1980
- and the corporate income tax - down from 24.9% of federal revenues in
1960 and 12.9% in 1980 - and the concomitant rise of the social insurance
taxes - up from 12.2% of federal revenues in 1960 and 28.0% in 1980.19 The
three revenue sources in the aggregate constitute a somewhat greater percentage
of federal revenues than they did in 1960, but virtually the same aggregate
percentage as they did in 1980. The revenue sources are another sign of the
primarily redistributive function of the federal government, as well as the
increasing role of Social Security and Medicare - programs which benefit the
elderly, primarily - within the redistributive category.
d. The Deficit
Federal outlays have exceeded federal receipts in all but two years since 1960,
and in every year starting with 1970. In the 1960s and 1970s these deficits were
relatively small as a percentage of the GDP - in only four out of twenty years
17

Id. at 369 (fiscal 1995 data).

Is Id.
19

DAvID B. WALKER,

THE

REBIRTh OF FEDERALISM

209 (1995).
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did the deficit exceed 3% of GDP, and in most years the annual deficit was
under 1.5% of GDP. Indeed, due to the growing economy, the federal debt as a
percentage of GDP declined steadily through those two decades from a high of
57.6% in 1960 (reflecting the enormous debt incurred to finance the Second
World War) to a post-War low of 33.6% in 1981. With the beginning of the
Reagan Administration, the annual deficit shot up to 4.1% in 1982 and 6.3% in
1983 and 5% or more in 1984, 1985, and 1986. The gross federal debt as a
percentage of GDP began to climb as well, up to 55.4% of GDP by the end of
the Reagan Administration and 69.5% at the end of the Bush Administration. 20
Due to federal budget-cutting, the annual deficit has begun to drop - from
4.9% of GDP in 1992, to 3.1% in 1994 and 2.3% in 1995 - the lowest figure
since 1979. The size of the debt as a percentage of the GDP, however, rose,
albeit more slowly, reaching, 70.3% in 1995.21
The federal budget deficit has dominated the politics of public finance for
more than a decade. With the federal government reluctant to raise revenues, the
deficit has created enormous pressure to hold down spending. One reason for the
rise of unfunded mandates may be the desire of the federal government to
engage in new regulatory and service initiatives without having to bear their
costs. The federal budget deficit is also behind the current efforts to curtail the
federal role in the income support and health care programs that escaped the
budget cutbacks of the Reagan years and actually expanded under President
Bush. Finally, sheer frustration with the persistence of the deficit has played a
major role in building support for the proposed balanced budget amendment.
2.

States and Local Governments

In fiscal year 1994, state and local government receipts came to $946 billion,
or 14% of GDP; state and local expenditures were $846 billion, or 13% of
GDP.22 Federal grants-in-aid came to $196 billion, or about 20% of total state
receipts, and about double the aggregate state and local budget surplus.
Aggregate state and local receipts have consistently exceeded state and local
outlays since 1960 - although in every year since 1970, federal grants-in-aid to
local governments have been larger than the excess of state and local receipts
over state and local outlays.3
State and local budgets as a percentage of GDP have grown steadily over the
last three decades, largely due to the expansion in state and local taxation. State
and local governments' own-source revenues as a percent of GDP have more
than doubled from 5.4% in 1946 to over 12% today.2 4
20 The Economic Report of the President 1996, at 368.
21
22

Id.
Id. at 371.

2 Id.
24

John Shannon, Federalism's 'Invisible Regulator' -

InterjurisdictionalCompetition, in

COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTs (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds.

1991).
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The states have the larger - and increasing - share of state and local
budgets, reversing the dominant position of localities three decades ago. States
and local governments also draw on different revenue sources. Sales and gross
receipts taxes are the leading source of state revenues, accounting for roughly
half of states' own-source revenues. State individual and corporate income taxes
account for a little less than 40% of states' own-source revenues. Miscellaneous
taxes and charges supply the remainder. Income taxes have played a growing
role in state finances. Currently, 44 states have a personal income tax, 46 states
deploy a corporate income tax, and 46 have a general sales tax. Thirty-nine
states use all three. 5
Local governments derive about 75% of their own-source revenues from the
property tax; another 15% of local revenues are provided by sales taxes. Less
than 5% of local revenues come from income taxes.26
Whereas most of federal spending is redistributive, most of state and local
spending is developmental, that is, their "main function is to assist in the
creation of the physical and social infrastructure necessary for economic
development." 27 Developmental programs include education, highways and mass
transit, environmental protection, sanitation, parks and recreation, and public
of
safety. According to political scientist Paul Peterson, approximately two-thirds
28
state spending and more than 85% of local spending is developmental.
The Informal Constitution and the Structure of Federalism

3.

The vertical differentiation of taxing and spending among the different levels
of government is, in part, attributable to the structure of horizontal federalism.
With open internal borders securing the flow of capital and labor throughout the
United States relatively free from state or local interference, smaller units will
find it difficult to engage in redistribution. If a state or locality attempts in any
serious way to tax the rich in order to give to the poor, more poor people may
enter and remain, while the rich will be more likely to depart to less
redistributive jurisdictions, thus reducing the tax base, increasing the burden of
redistributive programs, and making it more difficult to sustain the redistributive
policy.
State and local redistributive spending is further constrained by
interjurisdictional competition. When Peterson and his colleagues studied state
welfare spending they found that between 1976 and 1989 a typical state cut
welfare benefits by $19 for every $100 its benefits had exceeded the average
cut if
benefits in contiguous states in the preceding year. Benefits were further
29
the percentage of the state's population in poverty was on the increase.
2 WALKER, supra note 19, at 210.

Id. at 211.
27PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 64 (1995).
28

Id. at 70-71.

29 Paul E. Peterson, Devolution's Price, in PROSPECTS FOR A NEW FEDERALISM: JURISDICTIONAL
COMPmTITON AND COMPETENCE, Symposium at Yale Law School (March 1996).
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The national government is in the best position to engage in redistributive
activity. It can levy progressive taxes, or allocate tax dollars to social safety net
programs, with the least fear of losing high-income taxpayers to less
redistributive jurisdictions. Moreover, the federal government has at least the
formal legal authority (even if less success in practice) to control the national
borders and restrict immigration attracted by redistributive social programs.
By the same token, there is some argument that smaller units of government
are the appropriate providers of developmental programs. The small size of local
governments facilitates residents' oversight of the cost and quality of locallyprovided public goods and services. The vulnerability of smaller units to
taxpayer exit serves to discipline local taxing and spending decisions. The
multiplicity of local governments and the relative ease of taxpayer movement
among them place pressure on localities to be more efficient, lest they lose
desirable taxpayers to adjacent localities that provide better services at the same
tax price or comparable services at a lower tax cost. The multiplicity of local
governments also enables local taxpayers to compare the cost and quality of
their services with those in nearby communities. Moreover, local provision of
basic services permits greater responsiveness to differences in interlocal
preferences and circumstances. By contrast, it is less likely that federallyprovided services and programs would be tailored to differences in local
conditions and desires. It is more difficult for taxpayers to monitor federal
programs. And certainly nationally-provided public goods and services are less
subject to the market-like pressures of taxpayer exit.3 0
With respect to both developmental and redistributive programs, the states
occupy an intermediate position. They are less vulnerable to exit than localities,
but more vulnerable than the federal government. It is more difficult to monitor
state service quality than local quality, but easier than monitoring quality at the
federal level. States may have a particular role to play in setting developmental
policies that require coordination over a substantial geographic area. Major
systems of transportation, sanitation, air and water pollution control, and higher
education can be designed efficiently only if governments with broad territorial
reach, such as states, are involved in their planning and financing.3 '
For those concerned to maximize the beneficial effects of interjurisdictional
competition in promoting efficiency in the provision of public goods and
services, the national government's role in developmental activities should be
focused on spillovers, equalizing interjurisdictional fiscal disparities, and the
provision of those functions that would benefit from nationwide uniformity.
With respect to spillovers, some state or local activities may impose costs on
other jurisdictions. States and localities have little incentive to control these
costs. Conversely, some activities may have considerable benefits beyond state
or local borders. States and localities have little incentive to provide the optimal
amount of these benefits. National action will be necessary to control costly
spillovers, particularly in the environmental area, while assuring the optimal
30 See generally PETERSON, supra note 27, at 18-27.

3' Id. at 24-25.
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level for those programs, such as education and scientific research, that have
broader benefits.
Fiscal disparities arise from the enormous differences in taxable resources
among different jurisdictions. There are significant differences in natural
resources, economic activity, personal wealth, median incomes, and poverty rates
among the fifty states32 - and even greater differences among localities. These
differences have consequences for state and local spending. Thus, Peterson found
that in 1991 the ten wealthiest states spent almost $3000 per person for
developmental purposes; the ten poorest states spent only a little more than
$1500 per person.3 3 Similarly, the ten wealthiest states spent $830 per person on
34
redistributive programs whereas the ten poorest states spent just $411.
Finally, although diversity among state government programs is often
desirable, in some cases the nation as a whole would benefit from greater
uniformity. National standards in transportation, communication, and the
regulation of multistate firms may result in greater efficiency than variations
among the fifty states. Here, too, federal regulation may be appropriate.
Federal, state, and local fiscal practices do not necessarily accord with the
logic of fiscal federalism. States and localities engage in some redistributive
activity. The federal government provides developmental programs that have
primarily local, rather than national, significance. Indeed, there is no structural
constraint on federal developmental spending akin to the effect of interstate and
interlocal competition for tax base on state and local redistributive activity.
Federal grants-in-aid to states and localities do not necessarily smooth out
interjurisdictional fiscal disparities. The federal government may fail to address
interjurisdictional spillovers, provide for desirable levels of uniformity, or
provide an adequate social safety net.
Nevertheless, the structure of federalism has implications for the allocation of
fiscal responsibilities. State and local governments are less likely to provide
redistributive programs or provide public goods and services that have
significant benefits for the nation as a whole, and even developmental spending
is likely to vary according to state and local wealth. That does not mean that the
federal government will act to provide redistributive programs, subsidize
beneficial spillovers (and control costly ones), provide the services that would
benefit from nationwide uniformity, or equalize interjurisdictional disparities. It
just means that if the federal government does not undertake such programs,
they are less likely to occur at all.

32 Id. at 89.

13Id. at 91.
3 Id.
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The federal government has three general techniques for influencing state
fiscal practices: direct regulation, or mandates; grants-in-aid; and the Internal
Revenue Code.
i.

Mandates

Congress may directly command states and localities to undertake certain
activities. The United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations ("ACIR") issued a report in 1984 that counted some 36 major federal
statutes regulating state and local governments as of 1980. 31 In 1993, the ACIR
36
found that between 1981 and 1990, Congress enacted 27 additional mandates.
These include: Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act of 1986; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990;
Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1986 and 1990; Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984; Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988; and Safe
7
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986.3
According to the ACIR, the pace of federal mandate imposition accelerated in
the 1970s and 1980s. Traditionally, when federal policy-makers wanted state or
local governments to perform an activity or provide a service, Congress provided
financial incentives, such as grants-in-aid tied to the activity the federal
government sought to encourage. Since the 1970s, however, the federal
government has increasingly turned to direct commands - mandates - to
implement federal directives. To be sure, mandates and subsidies are frequently
combined. Most subsidies are conditioned on state or local participation in some
federal program, so they are, to that extent, mandates. Yet, insofar as the
decision to accept federal funds and the attendant federal commands is left to
the aided governments, the federal requirements are, in a sense, accepted
voluntarily.
With the growth of the federal budget deficit over the past two decades,
Congress has increasingly turned to unfrnded mandates - federal commands
that entail substantial unreimbursed costs for affected states and localities. Thus,
although Congress enacted only one statute requiring state and local compliance
in the 1930s, one in the 1940s, none in the 1950s, and nine in the 1960s,
Congress enacted 25 such statutes in the 1970s and 27 in the 1980s. Unfunded
mandates cannot be avoided by the simple expedient of rejecting federal grantsin-aid. Moreover, a grant-in-aid may come to feel like an unfunded mandate
35 United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regulatory Federalism:
Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 19-24 (1984).
36 United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Regulation of
State and Local Governments: The Mixed Record of the 1980s at 43-49 (1993).

37 Id.
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when the costs of the conditions for receiving federal aid are ratcheted up
without concomitant increases in the funds provided.
Broadly speaking, there are four types of mandates. Direct orders, as the term
suggests, consist of outright commands to states and localities, enforceable by
civil or criminal sanctions. Such mandates are common in the antidiscrimination, public employment, and environmental areas. These include
prohibitions on age discrimination, the extension of Social Security to public
employees, and the ban on the ocean dumping of municipal sludge. Crosscutting
requirements impose generally-applicable federal directives on grantees across
the board to further various national social and economic policies. The DrugFree Workplace Act of 1988, which requires certification by all federal grantees
and contractors of a drug-free workplace and the creation of employee
awareness, sanctions, and treatment programs, is an instance of a crosscutting
requirement. Crossover sanctions impose federal fiscal sanctions in one program
area or activity to influence state or local policy in another. The provision in the
Highway Safety Amendments of 1984 that tied federal grants to state adoption
of 21 as the legal drinking age is the classic instance of a crossover sanction.
Finally, partialpreemption occurs when federal laws establish basic policies in a
field, but states and localities may continue to exercise administrative control if
they conform their laws and regulations to federally-determined standards. Many
environmental laws utilize partial preemptions.
The Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of these techniques. In
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority," the Court upheld the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local governments. In
South Dakota v. Dole,39 as previously noted, the Court sustained the crossover
sanction in the Highway Safety Amendments Act of 1984, and, more generally,
upheld Congress' authority to attach conditions to federal grants-in-aid, subject
to a germaneness requirement. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 40 and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi,41 the Court validated partial preemption as a regulatory technique.
Although the Court, in New York v. United States,42 determined that Congress
could not compel states to enact legislation to carry out federal programs, New
York specifically confirmed the constitutionality of direct orders that do not
"commandeer" the state legislative process, of conditions tied to federal grants,
and of partial preemption. 43
Two surveys, one of 314 cities conducted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors
("USCM") and another of 128 counties conducted by the National Association
of Counties ("NACo"), attempted to estimate the costs of selected mandates in
1993. The USCM survey, which focused on 10 specific mandates affecting
cities, found current-year costs of $6.5 billion and estimated that these mandate
38

469 U.S. 528 (1985).

39 483 U.S. 203.

- 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
41 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
42 112 S. C. 2408 (1992).
43 Id. at 2424.
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costs would total $54 billion between 1994 and 1998. The 10 mandates together
consumed an average of 11.4% of locally-raised city revenues in the covered
cities. The NACo survey found that counties were spending an estimated $4.8
billion to comply with 12 specific mandates, and that the costs of these
programs would total $33.7 billion between 1994 and 1998. The 12 mandates
together consumed an average of 12.3% of county-raised revenues.*
For many state and local governments, the pain of mandates has been
compounded by the general reduction in federal intergovernmental aid since
1980. Between 1981 and 1989 federal discretionary funding to state and local
governments dropped 28% in inflation-adjusted dollars. From 1989 to 1993
federal aid to states and localities rose, but overall federal discretionary funding
to states and localities was still 18.2% less in real dollars in 1993 than it was in
45
1980.
ii.

Federal Grants-in-Aid

All government activities have three basic elements: policy-making, financing,
and administration. Federal grants-in-aid constitute an effort to combine some
federal financing with state/local administration and a mix of federal and
subnational policy-making. Grants-in-aid, thus, represent an alternative to: (a)
complete federal control of an activity - as is the case with Social Security and
Medicare; (b) unfunded federal mandates; and (c) pure state/local fiscal,
administrative, and policy-making autonomy. Federal grants-in-aid may be used
to increase the fiscal capacity of subnational governments generally, to equalize
interjurisdictional fiscal disparities, or to subsidize state/local provision of those
goods and services in which the federal government has an interest.
In FY 1995, the federal government provided state and local governments
with $228 billion in grants-in-aid.4 This constituted approximately 15% of all
federal spending, 22% of state-local spending, and 3% of GDP. Approximately
two-thirds of federal intergovernmental grants go to programs, such as Medicaid,
AFDC, and education and training programs, that make payments to individuals.
Most of the rest of the federal grants are for specific developmental purposes,
such as transportation and environmental protection. Hardly any federal grant
money goes for the general support of subnational governments.
With federal financial support comes a certain degree of federal policy-making
control and administrative oversight. Most federal grants are "categorical," that
is, the use of the funds is restricted to the category of activity the federal
government seeks to support. 47 Categorical grants are often accompanied by
detailed regulations intended to ensure that the federal funds are used for the
purposes for which they are given. These regulations are frequently a source of
4 John Kincaid, The Future of Mandate Relief: The Promise of New York and the Congress,
paper presented to the Section in Urban, State, and Local Government at the AALS Annual Meeting
(January 5, 1995).
45 Senate Report No. 104-1 (Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs on S.1) at 7-8.
4 Economic Report of the President 1996, at 114.
47 WALKER, supra note 19, at 18.
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tension between the federal governments and the states and localities who
receive the federal funds.
With so-called "block" grants, state and local aid recipients enjoy greater
flexibility in the use of federal funds. Instead of providing funds to narrowlydefined program categories, block grants are intended to cover broad program
areas, such as criminal justice, social services, or community development. Even
block grants limit recipients' discretion - a criminal justice block grant must be
used for criminal justice and not social services - and many block grants are
also subject to restrictions that govern how the federal funds are spent.
A significant portion of federal grants-in-aid is provided on a matching basis,
that is, the federal funds require a proportionate contribution of state or local
money." Matching grants are, typically, used to leverage state or local funds to
support programs in which there is some national interest. In uncapped matching
programs, the more money the state or local government provides for the aided
program, the more federal grant money it receives. Many matching grant
programs, however, are capped - once the limit on federal assistance is
reached, states and local governments bear the full costs of additional spending.
One consequence of the heavy reliance on matching grants is to reduce the
ability of federal grants-in-aid to ameliorate interstate fiscal disparities.
Particularly with respect to developmental assistance, matching requirements
tend to provide the greatest federal support to the states with the greatest taxable
resources. According to Peterson, for every one percent increase in a state's tax
capacity, the state received $3.42 in additional federal aid per person. More
affluent states tend to get more federal support than do poorer states because
affluent states tend to spend more of their own money on developmental
programs. The effect of state resources on federal support is less significant for
redistributive programs. 49
iii.

The Internal Revenue Code

The third major way in which the federal government can shape state fiscal
practices is through the Internal Revenue Code. Although the federal and state
governments may tax the same entities and events - such as personal incomes
- Congress has traditionally taken the sting out of the spectre of double
taxation by providing that state and local tax payments are deductible from
income subject to federal income taxation. Congress has also provided support
for state and local fiscal autonomy by making interest payments on most state
and local bonds exempt from federal income taxation.
The deductibility of state and local taxes from federal income taxation has
both horizontal and vertical consequences. Federal deductibility reduces the
impact of state and local taxation on interjurisdictional competition for tax base,
particularly when marginal federal tax rates are high. The federal income tax
41 Therese

J. McGuire, Federal Aid to States and Localities and the Appropriate Competitive

Framework, in COMPErTnON AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra note 24, at 160.
4 PETERSON, supra note 27, at 143-45.
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deductibility of state and local taxes, thus, facilitates a higher level of state and
local taxation and spending, and can also support some measure of state and
local - especially state - redistributive taxation since part of the burden of
higher state/local taxes can be displaced to the federal treasury.
The significance of federal deductibility was considerably reduced in the
1980s with the reduction of the top marginal tax rates and the overall
compression of the tax rate structure. Moreover, the 1986 Tax Reform Act
eliminated the deductibility of state sales taxes, except in those states without an
income tax. Other tax law changes have reduced the benefits of deductibility for
taxpayers who pay at the highest marginal rates. As a result, federal tax reforms
have increased the salience of state and local taxes to taxpayers. Indeed, the
1980s witnessed a general reduction in the top marginal rates of state income
taxes - although many of these reductions predated the 1986 Act.
By exempting bond interest from income taxation, the federal government
enables states and localities to offer their debt instruments at rates considerably
below market interest rates for commercial offerings. In 1995, states and
localities issued $155 billion in bonds. Due to the tax exemption, states and
local governments saved $2.3 billion in interest costs for the debt issued that
year. Moreover, in 1995, there was $1.2 trillion in state and local debt
outstanding, so that the federal tax exemption enabled states and localities to
save about $12.9 billion in interest costs. 0 As with state and local deductibility,
the value of the tax-exemption is directly affected by federal tax rates. Thus, the
federal rate reductions of the 1980s reduced the benefit of the tax exemption for
state and local bonds.
The tax exemption for state and local bond interest subsidizes primarily state
and local developmental activity, as developmental programs are frequently
financed by borrowing while redistributive programs rarely are. However, it is
not targeted to state and local programs with interjurisdictional spillovers or
broad national benefits. Moreover, the federal subsidy is keyed to the volume of
state and local borrowing, rather than to fiscal need. The tax exemption is a
relatively inefficient subsidy. While municipal bond rates are driven by average
federal income tax rates, most of the bonds are purchased by taxpayers in the
highest income brackets. As a result, the cost to the federal treasury is
significantly greater than the benefit to states and localities - with the
difference a benefit to high income taxpayers. In 1995, the total revenue loss to
the federal government from the municipal bond tax exemption was an estimated
$20.1 billion - with a $7.2 billion tax break for investors added to the $12.9
51
billion benefit to states and localities.
At one time it was believed - and many states continue to argue - that the
federal tax exemption for state and local bond interest is constitutionally
mandated. When, in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Congress required that state and municipal bonds be issued in registered, rather
50 Edward V. Regan, End the Municipal Bond Subsidy, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 26,

1996, at A20.
51 Id.
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than in bearer, form in order to make it more difficult for tax evaders and those
engaged in illicit activities to hide income, twenty-five states claimed that even a
mere registration requirement unconstitutionally abridged an "essential sovereign
function" of the states - the power to borrow - because "registered bonds are
more costly to issue than bearer bonds and therefore ... future bond issues will
generate smaller net revenues" for the States.52 In South Carolina v. Baker, 3 the
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding instead that there is no
constitutional requirement for the tax exemption of state and local debt.
Notwithstanding the lack of a constitutional mandate, Congress has preserved the
tax exemption for state and local bond interest, although it has curtailed the
availability of the exemption for so-called "private activity" bonds; that is, state
and local borrowing intended to subsidize private industry in order to persuade
firms to relocate to or remain with the state or locality.
b. State Impacts on Federal Fiscal Practices
Vertical federalism is not simply a one-way street. Although federal mandates,
grants-in-aid, and tax exemptions have enabled the federal government to
promote federal policies at the state level, the states can also have an impact on
federal fiscal practices.
State Manipulation of Federal Programs

i.

States and localities have proven themselves adept at manipulating federal
programs. The tightening up of the federal tax exemption for state and local
"private activity" bonds was a response to the longstanding state and local
practice of using the tax exemption to obtain a federal subsidy for state and
local industrial development programs - including direct loans to private
industry - rather than to support traditional public services.
More recently, states successfully exploited the terms of the Medicaid
program to increase federal support of state activities. Medicaid provides federal
funds to match qualified state expenditures on health care, primarily care for the
indigent and long-term nursing care for the elderly. The federal contribution to a
state depends on a formula that factors in the per capita income of the state. The
federal government pays at least 50% of Medicaid costs in each state, and up to
83% in the poorest states. In the 1980s, the states moved adroitly to shift more
of their traditional public health costs to Medicaid by having these qualify for
federal Medicaid reimbursement whenever Medicaid-eligible people were served.
More importantly, the states invented the so-called "bootstrap financing"
technique, by which hospitals and other health care providers were persuaded
either to make voluntary donations to state Medicaid-funded programs or to
consent to state taxation, with the resulting revenues earmarked for Medicaid
programs. These donations and provider tax dollars then became eligible for
federal Medicaid matching money. Ultimately, the donations and provider tax
52
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payments were returned to their original sources, but first the states netted the
federal matching funds. In effect, the providers were held harmless, but their
"donations" and "taxes" were used to leverage an expanded federal
contribution to state health programs.

54

Once the bootstrap technique was perfected at the end of the 1980s, its use
spread rapidly. In FY 1990, just 5.8% of state Medicaid spending came from
donations and provider taxes, but in 1992, when the federal government began
to crack down on the practice, 19.3% of state Medicaid spending came from
these sources, rising to 21.1% in 1993. State Medicaid spending rose 26.9% in
1991 and 27.9% in 1992, with three-eighths of the increase attributable to
bootstrap financing.55
ii.

States as Models

Increasingly, the states are being cited as a model for the reform of federal
fiscal practices. Although the federal constitution imposes little constraint on
federal or state fiscal practices, many state constitutions limit state taxing,
borrowing, and spending.
Most state constitutions require their states to adopt balanced budgets and give
their governors the power of line-item veto. In addition, a number of states give
their governors enhanced powers to reduce state spending to maintain budget
balance during the fiscal year. Most state constitutions also include a variety of
debt limitations. Some ban state debt outright. Others impose low dollar limits
on the amount of debt a state can incur. A few states set the amount of debt or
debt service as a fraction of the state's taxable wealth or of state revenues. Most
commonly, states rely on a procedural restriction: debt may not be incurred
without the approval of a majority of state voters in a referendum, or a
supermajority vote in the legislature, or both. As a result, debt plays a much
smaller role in financing government operations at the state level than at the
56
national level.
Finally, twenty state constitutions impose some limit on state spending or state
taxation. These provisions typically limit spending to a percentage of total
personal income in the state, or limit the rate of spending or revenue increase to
the rate of growth of the state economy or the state's population. Other
measures, like California's Proposition 13, directly restrict local taxation. At
least nine states impose a special procedural hurdle before the state may adopt a
tax increase - either a supermajority in the legislature or the approval of the
voters in a referendum. Six states require a legislative supermajority simply for
the adoption of a budget. Many states constitutionalize the process of budget
adoption and include numerous detailed requirements concerning state
spending.57 Indeed, political scientist Matthew McCubbins recently determined
there are "at least 170 sections in the various articles of the California
14See RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING AcTs 29-30 (Twentieth Century Fund 1996).
55 STEVEN D. GOLD,THE FIscAL CRiSiS OF THE STATES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 28-31 (1995).
56 BRIFFAULT,

supra note 54, at 43.

57Id. at 55-56.
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''5
Constitution that affect government budget policy. 1
These state fiscal practices have become a model for those who would like to
curtail federal spending and close the persistent federal budget deficit. Both
Presidents Reagan and Bush repeatedly called for a federal balanced budget
amendment. Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton sought a Presidential lineitem veto, arguing that the line-item veto would promote fiscal balance. A
statutory version of the line-item veto was recently signed into law. 59
Although the federal budget gap could be eliminated by increased taxation as
well as by spending cuts, the conservative reform agenda has also sought to
limit the federal government's ability to raise taxes. The tax-cutting that marked
the Reagan administration is directly traceable to the spread of tax and
expenditure limitations among the states in the late 1970s.60 More recently, one
of the first acts of the House of Representatives in the 104th Congress was to
amend its own rules to require a three-fifths vote for any tax increase - a mark
of the influence of state supermajority requirements for increases in taxation.

Ill.

THREE CURRENT ISSUES

A. Mandates Relief
Few issues in intergovernmental relations generate more conflict than
unfunded mandates. Following years of state and local complaints, Congress
passed and the President signed into law the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995.61 The Act provides for both greater deliberation concerning, and a
procedural barrier against, the enactment of new unfunded mandates.
Specifically, the Act states that "it shall not be in order" for either House of
Congress to consider any bill or joint resolution reported by a committee unless
the committee has published an analysis, undertaken by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), of any mandates greater than $50 million that the bill or
joint resolution contains; and that "it shall not be in order" for either House to
consider any measure that would increase the direct cost of federal
intergovernmental mandates by $50 million unless the measure provides the
funds to cover the mandate's costs.
The Act excludes from these restrictions existing mandates - except insofar
as those mandates are increased - and measures that enforce the constitutional
rights of individuals or establish or enforce statutory rights that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
handicap, or disability.
Legislation will be treated as an intergovernmental mandate if it either
imposes a duty without providing the funds to pay for that duty or, with respect
58 Matthew D. McCubbins, Putting the State Back Into State Government: The Constitution and
the Budget, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE
EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, eds. 1995)
59 Item-Veto Act, P.L. 104-330.
60 See MIcHAEL B. BERKMAN, THE STATE ROOTS OF NATIONAL PoLITIcs (1993).
61 P.L. 104-4.
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to large entitlement programs - for which state and local participation is,
typically, voluntary - if it increases the stringency of the conditions on
assistance or caps or cuts federal funds without giving the affected governments
the authority to reduce their duties to provide services.
The restriction on new unfunded mandates relies on a procedural device.
Instead of a constitutional amendment, which would require approval by twothirds of both houses and ratification by three-quarters of the states, or a
statutory bar on unfunded mandates, which would be easier to enact but would
be superseded by any new statute containing an unfunded mandate, the law
amends Congress's rules to make legislative consideration of unfunded
mandates, as defined by the Act, "out of order." The houses of Congress would
have to expressly amend or suspend the rule before a mandate could be
considered, let alone adopted. This restriction, however, gives considerable
power to the Congressional leadership to rule on whether a mandate is "in
order," and to the CBO to determine whether a particular measure actually
contains a proscribed federal mandate, since often neither the cost of a particular
federal legislative directive nor the sufficiency of any funds provided to offset
the mandate's costs will be apparent on the measure's face. The vesting of such
enormous power in unelected bureaucrats and in the presiding officers of the
Congress to block consideration of legislative measures is a very troubling
feature of the Act. It is a direct consequence of the Act's attempt to make a
quasi-constitutional change - the preclusion of unfunded intergovernmental
mandates - without a constitutional amendment.
There is a strong federalism case against unfunded mandates. Unfunded
mandates force states and localities to devote their resources to federally
determined ends. This limits the capacity of states and localities to apply their
resources to their own policies and programs and may interfere with their ability
to provide the services their constituents expect of them. Unfunded mandates
fragment accountability. The public may not know which level of government is
responsible for a program - the state or locality carrying it out or the federal
government which determines state and local programmatic and financial
obligations. The unfunded mandate device may encourage the enactment of
unwise legislation, since the political benefits of the legislation will accrue to the
members of Congress who vote for it, but the fiscal, administrative, and other
costs will be borne by the state and local governments who have to carry it out.
Nevertheless, it is not certain that all unfunded mandates are undesirable as a
matter of federalism. It may be appropriate for Congress to deploy mandates to
force states and localities to take into effect the costs their actions impose on
other states and localities. To that extent states and localities may actually
benefit from federal mandates. Federal mandates may also be useful in
promoting national standards for multi-state firms and other businesses that are
engaged in interstate commerce. Federal mandates can reduce the pressure that
interjurisdictional competition for economic development places on states to
refrain from regulatory or redistributive programs. The fear of welfare-induced
migration may cause states to reduce welfare benefits to a level below what they
would otherwise provide. Similarly, state competition for jobs may limit the
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generosity of unemployment insurance programs. Federal mandates can assure
nationwide standards in these areas.
Arguably, the problem with unfunded mandates is not the mandate but the
lack of federal funds to offset the mandated costs. The attack on unfunded
mandates assumes, as a baseline matter, that states and localities have a
protected interest in not assuming certain costs. But if the people of the United
States, through their elected federal representatives, determine that certain
behavior - the provision of unsafe drinking water, the dumping of wastes in
the ocean, the failure to provide certain workplace benefits, the failure to
facilitate voter registration - is unacceptable as a matter of national policy, then
it is at least debatable whether states and localities should be compensated for
no longer engaging in such unacceptable behavior. Moreover, in the current
fiscally constrained federal budget climate, a ban on unfunded mandates is
tantamount to a ban on mandates altogether.
In the last quarter-century, Congress and federal agencies have often failed to
give sufficient attention to the distinctive circumstances, policy-making
autonomy, and fiscal needs of states and localities. The provisions of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act that are intended to improve the quality of
information presented to federal decision-makers concerning the impact of
mandates on states and localities and that require federal actors to take that
information into account before adopting new mandates are certainly desirable.
Unfunded mandates should always be open to the question of why, if Congress
thinks a matter sufficiently important to be mandated, it is not willing to pay for
it. But given the reasons why mandates may be necessary to control spillovers,
limit the undesirable effects of interjurisdictional competition, and provide for
nationwide uniformity on matters of nationwide significance, an outright ban on
mandates - particularly a ban effectuated through the manipulation of
legislative procedure and without the broader constitutional debate that ought to
precede the adoption of such a measure - seems unwise.
B. Block Grants
During the Reagan Administration dozens of smaller categorical grants were
eliminated and others were consolidated into block grants. States and localities
have long preferred block grants, which give them greater policy-maker
autonomy and loosen federal administrative oversight of state and local use of
federal funds. However, even after the Reagan Administration, the vast majority
of federal grant programs continued to consist of categorical assistance.
A centerpiece of the new federalism initiatives of the 104th Congress was the
proposal to convert several major federal redistributive programs from
categorical entitlement programs to block grants. In theory, block grants can
provide a way of blending the superior federal financial capacity to support
redistributive programs with a new flexibility that would give states greater
freedom to experiment with new coverage and cost-containment initiatives, to
tailor their programs to their particular state and local conditions, and to be free
of burdensome federal regulatory oversight. From the perspective of the states,
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the problem with federal financial assistance is that it so often comes "with
strings attached." States - and the intended beneficiaries of state redistributive
programs - need federal support to adequately fund programs for the poor and
to ameliorate the anti-redistributive pressures built into the structure of interstate
competition, but they have long resented the federal intrusion into state
administrative and policy decision-making that comes with federal financial
support. They have seen in block grants a means of loosening the strings tied so
tightly to categorical grants-in-aid.
But not all block grant proposals are helpful to the states - or to the
beneficiaries of state redistributive programs. Thus, the plan first advanced by
Republicans in the 104th Congress would have converted both the welfare and
Medicaid programs to block grants, and then would have capped the amount of
money available to the states for these programs, permitting some increase for
state population growth, but not for inflation or for any growth in the population
of the needy. 2 Unlike matching assistance, a capped grant eliminates any
incentive for states and localities to commit new funds to the program.
Moreover, all of the additional costs generated by inflation, population growth,
and economic slowdowns will be borne by state governments. To keep these
costs from breaking their budgets, states are likely to hold down benefit levels.
With the federal government no longer matching additional state welfare and
Medicaid payments, the states' inherent reluctance to provide generous benefits
lest they attract more poor people would probably become more acute. States
that provide relatively high levels of benefits would be under greater pressure to
bring their assistance levels into line with those of their less generous neighbors,
and all states would be constrained from adding to their programs.
In other words, the Republican block grant proposal entailed not just a
devolution of policy-making and administrative responsibility, but a devolution
of financial responsibility, as well. The likely result is not more power to the
states, but a reduction in the ability of states to provide for the needy. As long
as states are required to maintain open borders and provide welfare assistance to
all the poor within the jurisdiction - whether newcomers or old-timers63 - and
to fund additional welfare assistance out of their own resources, the structure of
horizontal federalism will operate to reduce the states' willingness to provide for
redistributive programs. In the guise of devolution, capped block grants are
likely to lead to an overall reduction in public support for the needy.
Capped grants would appear to be based not on any commitment to greater
state autonomy in the regulation and administration of redistributive programs,
but instead on a desire to cut the federal budget deficit without raising taxes.
The deficit reduction accomplished in the Clinton Administration involved both
an appreciable increase in federal taxation - FY 1995 receipts as a percent of
GDP were the highest since 1981 - and steep cuts in spending on national
defense. Indeed, defense spending as a percent of GDP was lower in FY 1995
62
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19961

U.S. PUBLIC FINANCE

than in any year since 1948.64 Nonredistributive federal spending had already
been cut substantially in the Reagan amd Bush years.
With the Republicans in control of Congress philosophically committed to
cutting the budget deficit and equally opposed to increasing taxation - and with
defense spending and nonredistributive spending already cut substantially further deficit reduction will require cuts in redistributive spending. With Social
Security and Medicare enjoying greater political support, Medicaid and AFDC
are prime targets for cuts. Moreover, Social Security and Medicare are fully
federally funded. Any cut in federal outlays for those programs would
necessarily result in program cuts, and Congress would be politically
accountable. AFDC and Medicaid, however, are shared federal-state programs,
administered by the states, and subject to federal regulations, but financed by a
combination of federal grants and state and local revenues. In theory, capping
federal support need not result in program reductions since states could make up
the difference out of their own revenues. Thus, the magnitude of the reduction in
support for these essential components of the social safety net may be obscured
by the intricacies of fiscal federalism, much as whatever blame accrues for
spending cuts in these areas would be diffused over several levels of
government.
C.

The Balanced Budget Amendment

For most of the past two decades, the federal budget deficit has been a major
focus of public concern. The deficit ballooned at the beginning of the Reagan
Administration and persisted at historically high levels thereafter. In response to
the deficit, many officials, commentators, and ordinary citizens have urged that
the Constitution be amended to mandate a balanced budget.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have, in different years,
voted to submit a balanced budget amendment to the states for ratification. The
House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a balanced budget amendment
early in 1995. That proposal failed in the Senate by just two votes. 6 The 105th
Congress is likely to take up the amendment again.
The balanced budget amendment presents two interesting federalism issues:
the role of state balanced budget requirements as a model for federal
constitutional reform; and the likely impact of a federal balanced budget
amendment on the states.
1. The States as Models for Federal Constitutional Reform
Balanced budget advocates frequently cite the experience of the states in
making the case for a federal balanced budget amendment. They contend that
most state constitutions require balanced state budgets; that states generally
6 Economic Report of the President 1996, at 368.
65 Initially, the amendment failed by one vote. Republican Leader Dole then switched his vote
from affirmative to negative to enable him - as a member of the prevailing negative side - to
move for a revote subsequently.
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achieve balanced budgets; and, therefore, that the state constitutional
amendments cause the states to achieve budgetary balance. For amendment
proponents, the states' experience demonstrates that American governments can
function with constitutional balanced budget requirements and that a
constitutional amendment can provide the federal government with the same
fiscal discipline it now lacks but the states enjoy.
Balanced budget proponents tend to exaggerate the extent of the states'
constitutional commitment to fiscal balance. Despite sweeping assertions that
virtually all state constitutions require balanced budgets, in fact only about 36
out of 50 state constitutions actually require that their states' budgets be
balanced without borrowing. Most of the other states have statutory balanced
budget requirements, but not constitutional directives. Moreover, in many states
capital funds and a multiplicity of special funds are often not considered a part
of the state budget subject to the balanced budget requirement.66
Although most states do balance their budgets most of the time, many states
- including states with constitutional balanced budget requirements - achieve
technical balance through a range of clever gimmicks, fiscal tricks, and
budgetary sleights of hand. A state may juggle cash and accrual accounting
methods, so that revenues are counted in the year in which they accrue but
expenditures are deferred to the year cash is paid out. Other gambits include
deferring payments to vendors, selling off assets, underfunding public employee
pension plans, and financing programs through quasi-autonomous public
authorities and other "off-budget" entities. 67 Moreover, there has been relatively
little judicial enforcement of state balanced budget requirements -- which raises
a significant question concerning the importance of balanced budget
68
requirements in constraining state finances.
States - including states without constitutional balanced budget requirements
balance their budgets most of the time not because their constitutions require
them to do so, but because of the structure of the federal system and the
demands of the credit market. The states lack the fiscal and monetary tools and
the tax base of the federal government. States can neither print money nor close
their borders to prevent residents and businesses from fleeing to other
jurisdictions to avoid high levels of state taxation. In order to borrow, a state
must demonstrate to potential lenders its capacity to repay its debts. If a state
were to persistently run a significant deficit, its creditworthiness would be
undermined. Like households or businesses, states balance their budgets - or
come reasonably close to doing so - not because their constitutions require it
but because the market demands it. State constitutional requirements no doubt
affect state fiscal practices. But the bond market and interstate competition for
tax base - not state constitutions - do the real work of imposing fiscal
69
discipline upon the states.
66 See BRiFFAULT, supra note 54, at 7-14.
67 Id. at 15-27.
61 See id. at 35-41.
69 See id. at 63-65.
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The national government is, of course, quite different. The United States can
print money and control the currency; it has an enormous tax base; and it can
control its borders to constrain the flight of taxpayers. Indeed, the United States
has had little difficulty in persuading lenders to provide it with the funds
necessary to finance its enormous debt. So long as lenders believe that the
United States can and will repay its debts they are likely to continue to finance
its deficits.
There is nothing in the state experience that demonstrates that constitutional
limitations alone, unaccompanied by economic curbs on the ability to tax and
borrow, will produce a balanced budget. In the absence of practical economic
and political constraints on debt finance at the national level, it is unlikely that a
constitutional amendment by itself would supply much discipline.
2.

The Impact of a Federal Balanced Budget Requirement on the States

Although many state legislatures have urged the adoption of a federal
balanced budget constitutional amendment, it is likely that in the present anti-tax
political climate the impact of a balanced budget would be borne by the states.
With tax receipts up and defense spending, as a percentage of GDP, at its lowest
level in nearly fifty years, the primary focus of budget balancing activity will be
domestic spending. The lion's share of federal domestic spending currently
consists of the politically sacrosanct Social Security and Medicare programs, and
interest payments on the national debt. With the federal government itself
directly providing relatively few public goods and services, the most likely
targets of budget-cutting efforts will be federal payments to states and localities.
Indeed, federal grants-in-aid to states and localities are approximately the same
size as the annual budget deficit. With most programs of developmental
assistance having been cut back in the 1980s, further federal spending reductions
will, of necessity, have to cut into state and local programs for the needy - as
the discussion of block grants indicates.
Here the states' experience with their own balanced budget requirements may
be instructive. A significant portion of state spending - a nationwide average of
28% in 1992 - consists of aid to local governments. A central state budgetbalancing strategy in the last two decades has been to reduce payments or to
shift costs to local governments. As a result, from the mid-1980s to the early
1990s local taxes rose faster than state taxes. This process accelerated during
state fiscal crises. In Connecticut, aid to localities, including school districts,
dropped from 38.4% of the state budget in 1991 to 34.4% in 1995. In
Massachusetts, over the period from 1988 to 1994, state support for localities
dropped even more sharply, from 24.6% of the budget to 15.2% Between 1990
and 1994, California localities had to absorb $6.9 billion in aid cuts or new
costs, accounting for one-sixth of the funds used to close the state budget gap.7 0
A federal government compelled to balance its budget would surely follow the
lead of the states and resort to reductions in assistance to subnational
70 Id. at 27-28.
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governments as a preeminent fiscal strategy. Thus, an important impact of a
federal balanced budget amendment could be on the states' ability to balance
their own budgets. Not only would new federal aid - like the Medicaid
bootstrap financing so nicely exploited by the states in the early 1990s - be
unavailable to close budgetary gaps during times of fiscal stress, but the level of
ongoing support for states and localities would probably be reduced, thereby
creating new fiscal strains for the states. States would be particularly hardpressed
to fund redistributive programs. 7
The federal balanced budget amendment is viewed primarily as a tool for
imposing fiscal discipline at the national level. In the balanced budget debate,
the states are cited as an example of how constitutional balanced budget
requirements can work. But the real significance of a federal balanced budget
requirement from the vantage point of federalism is likely to be an increase in
the fiscal pressures on the states.
This may be the common strand in all three components of the current
devolutionary program - mandates relief, block grants, and the balanced
budget. Although their proponents speak of reducing the federal role and
restoring the policymaking autonomy and relative significance of the states in
our structure of government by cutting back on the federal role, these initiatives
are likely to reduce federal support for the states, exacerbate the interstate
competition for business and tax base, and lower the aggregate governmental
support - not just federal support - for redistributive programs. Federal
support for redistributive programs is central to our informal fiscal constitution.
If the federal government were to withdraw from supporting the needy - by
reducing mandates, capping block grants, or creating constitutional limits on
federal spending - the structure of horizontal federalism makes it unlikely that
states and localities would step into the breach and take up the role the federal
government has played in the last several decades. Indeed, with state
redistributive spending receiving less support - or compulsion - from the
national government, and with the states themselves dependent on increasingly
mobile firms and taxpayers for revenues, the states are also likely to reduce their
redistributive spending.

7' See, e.g., Karen M. Paget, The Balanced Budget Trap, 29 THE AMERICAN PRosPEcr 21 (Nov.Dec. 1996).

